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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tunity for judicial reconciliation of theory was not seized in
Kelly v. Hoff mon,50 which was decided upon the pleadings with
indecisive language used. Further, the decision would not make
failure to edit negligence as a matter of law, and as such was
unsound. The basic failure to "bring home" to participants the
grave dangers involved satisfies the causal relation, whether or
not the defamation is outside the prepared script.
Where there is no script because of the informal nature of the
program, the station must bear the risk of liability. The risks
are foreseeable and it seems just that the station should under-
take them.
The legislature has not sufficiently clarified the basis of lia-
bility in any jurisdiction. The soundest enactments are found in
Florida and Washington where the statutes codify the Summit
Hotel decision. In the absence of statute, it is submitted that the
rules developed above will prove workable in determining lia-
bility under the common law concepts of defamatory publication.
WILLIAM R. HIRSCH*
THE POSSIBILITY OF USING CHEMICAL TESTS TO DETERMINE
ALCOHOLIC INTOXICATION IN THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Defendant, while driving on a public highway, is involved in
an accident. As the police arrive they notice that defendant is
having trouble in getting out from behind the steering wheel.
After helping defendant from behind the wheel, and after talking
to him for a few minutes, the officers decide that defendant is
intoxicated and so place him under arrest.
Sometime later, defendant is brought to trial for violation of
Mo. REV. STAT. § 8401 (g) (Supp. 1945) which provides: "No
person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated con-
dition, or when under the influence of drugs."1
50. Recently commented upon in 24 NOTRE DA~m LAw, 123 (1949); 4
INTR. L. REv. (N. Y. U.) 94 (1949); 3 RUTGERS L. Rav. 128 (1949); 97
U. OF PA. L. REv. 444 (1949); 3 MIAMI L. Q. 312 (1949).
* Member of the Missouri Bar; former member of the staff, WASH.
U. L.Q.
1. State v. Raines, 333 Mo. 538, 62 S.W. 2d 727 (1933), states that
intoxicated condition need not be defined. Any intoxication that in any
manner impairs the ability of a person to operate an automobile is suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction under this statute.
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I
At present in Missouri, the determination of whether or not
defendant is intoxicated is based on certain external factors such
as: the driver nearly fell out of the automobile when the officer
opened the door, the officer was unable to awaken him, there was
a strong odor of liquor, there was evidence that he had vomited,
he could not walk or stand without aid.2 Other methods of de-
termining whether or not a defendant is intoxicated are:
.... testimony of witnesses who had observed the appear-
ance and actions of the accused, testimony of police surgeons
and private physicians based upon examination of the ac-
cused, and the finding of incriminating real evidence at the
scene of the accident or arrest.3
Thus it can be seen that evidence as to the intoxicated condi-
tion of a defendant is based on an observation of the defendant's
appearance and conduct at the time of the arrest.
Monroe in his article, "The Drinking Driver: Problems of
Enforcement," points out six main disadvantages to this type of
evidence.4 To begin with, he says that due to the fact that there
are many pathological conditions which produce symptoms simi-
lar to those produced by alcohol, it is relatively easy for the
defense attorney to instill doubt in the minds of the jury by
pointing out this fact to them and thus obtaining an acquittal
for his client.
The second disadvantage is found in the difficulty of identify-
ing intoxication from "external manifestations," as no two per-
sons act alike while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
This fact is bound to cause uncertainty in the minds of witnesses
so that their testimony cannot be relied upon.
Third among the disadvantages of the traditional methods of
proving intoxication is their basic reliance upon the kind and
quantity of liquor consumed. Evidence as to drinking alone can-
not prove how much alcohol has influenced the individual. An
accurate measure of the degree of intoxication of an individual
can be obtained only by determining the amount of alcohol ac-
cumulated in the brain.
A fourth weakness is the difficulty of identifying the so-called
2. Ibid.
3. Monroe, The Drinking Driver: Problems of Enforcement, 8 Q. J. OF
STUDIES ON ALCOHOL, No. 3, p. 388 (Dec. 1947).
4. Id. at 389.
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"moderately" intoxicated person. The problem is caused by those
who have had enough to impair their judgment, but not enough
to affect their appearance markedly.
Fifth among the weaknesses is the difficulty of determining
whether a person has reached that state of intoxication at which
he succumbs to the influence of alcohol.
Last of the prevailing weaknesses of the traditional methods
are the many administrative and enforcement difficulties which
result from dependence upon lay and expert testimony relative to
external evidence of intoxication.
As a solution to this dilemma, it is suggested that Missouri
turn to the use of chemical testing as a sound and equitable
approach to the problem of the drinking driver. It is a well
recognized fact that the problem of the drinking driver is be-
coming more acute every year. In a study made by the Safety
Council of Greater St. Louis, it is shown that from January until
July of 1949, there had been 149 intoxicated drivers involved in
traffic accidents in St. Louis, compared with 83 for the corre-
sponding period of the year previous, or an increase of approxi-
mately 80 per cent. The report further states that this figure
represents reports of only approximately 30 per cent of the
accidents involving intoxicated drivers, thus making the previous
noted increase more alarming.6
Chemical tests as proof of intoxication consist of the determi-
nation of the concentration of alcohol in the brain by analyzing
various body materials such as blood, urine, spinal fluid, saliva,
and breath. As a result of the test, the amount of blood alcohol
in the person's body at the time of the test is determined; this
indicates the individual's condition at the time of the test.7
The amount of blood alcohol is generally expressed in per-
centage form and as a result certain chemical standards have
been set up for the legal interpretation of the degree of intoxica-
5. See note 1 supra. A question for the jury in Missouri.
6. ANTOINE, A REPORT ON THE DRINKING DivEn PROBLEM, SAFETY
COUNCIL OF GREATER ST. Louis, 1 (Oct. 18, 1949). General recommenda-
tions for setting up a program of chemical testing in St. Louis.
Kansas City is using the Harger Drunkometer which is a device for
determining the degree of intoxication of an individual by analyzing his
breath. As a result of this program its traffic safety record has increased
steadily.
7. CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION, TRAINING MANUAL No. 1, INDI-
ANA STATE POLICE. Shows mechanical aspects of making a drunkometer
test.
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tion of a particular defendant. These percentages are divided
into three broad zones of alcohol concentration. They are:
1. Below 0.05 per cent alcohol in the blood: no influence by
alcohol within the meaning of the law;
2. Between 0.05 and 0.15 per cent, a liberal, wide zone:
alcohol influence usually is present, but courts of law are
advised to consider the behavior of the individual and cir-
cumstances leading to the arrest in making their decision;
3. 0.15 per cent: definite evidence of "under the influence"
measurable extent, lacks some of that clearness of intel-
lect and control of himself that he would normally possess.
The zone below 0.05 per cent vindicates the non-drinking or
temperate driver, the wide middle zone considers tolerance
and idiosycrasy, and the highest zone indicates alcoholic in-
fluence regardless of unusual tolerance .... s
At the present time chemical tests and the interpretation of
them are accurate and have been generally recognized by the
medical profession as such.9 As far as can be determined, only
one case has question the scientific accuracy of this method and
in that case the court said that in view of the fact that there was
no testimony in the record of its [Harger Drunkometer] general
acceptance by the medical profession as accurately establishing
the alcoholic content of a subject's blood and thus the extent of
his intoxication, the results of the test should not have been
admitted into evidence by the trial court.0 The fact to be noted
in this case is that the court did not say that it could not be
admitted into evidence when and if the proper foundation is laid
as to its scientific accuracy.
II
What is the possibility of using chemical tests as evidence of
intoxication under the law of Missouri as it exists today? One
argument that would undoubtedly be raised by the defendant's
attorney is that such tests are a violation of the state constitution
which provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself in any criminal case-self-incrimination. In the
8. "Report of American Medical Association Committee to Study Prob-
lems of Motor Vehicle Accidents," 119 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 635 (June 20,
1942). Quoted in "CHEMIcAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION" 35, supra note 7.
9. The American Bar Association, American Medical Association, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, International Association of Chiefs of Police,
and National Safety Council have all adopted this view.
10. People v. Morse, 38 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. 1949). Contra: Kirschuring
v. Farrar, 114 Colo. 421, 166 P.2d 154 (1946); Natwich v. Moyer et ux.,
117 Ore. 486, 163 P.2d 936 (1945).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/12
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majority of the states using chemical tests, where the defendant
has voluntarily consented to take the test, the results thereof
are admissible into evidence as proof of the defendant's intoxi-
cated condition.U
It is submitted that the better rule would be the limiting of
the principle of self-incrimination to testimonial utterances only.
In commenting upon this question, Ladd and Gibson in their
article, "Legal Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine
Intoxication,"I2 quote from the North Carolina case of State v.
Graham, where the court says:
Confessions which are not voluntary if they are not made,
or in hope of escaping punishment if they are made, are not
received as evidence, because experience shows that they are
liable to be influenced by those motives, and cannot be relied
on as guides to the truth. But this objection will not apply
to evidence of the sort before us. No fears or hopes of the
prisoner could produce the resemblance of his track to that
found in the cornfield.13
The article goes on to say:
The privilege should not be extended to the body fluid cases
any more than-to the fingerprint cases or other objective
manifestations which could not be altered as a result of their
compulsory taking.
Missouri, however, does not so limit the doctrine of self-
incrimination so it is necessary to study the decided cases dealing
with the taking of physical examinations in order to determine
whether or not the results of chemical tests to determine intoxi-
cation may be admitted into evidence as proof of the defendant's
11. State v. Morkrid, 286 N.W. 412 (Iowa 1939). 1... In the record
we are unable to discover evidence of either compulsion or entrapment.
.. ." It appears that the test was taken by the defendant voluntarily as
he expected to be shown not to be intoxicated. Spitler v. State, 221 Ind.
107, 46 N.E.2d 591 (1943). Defendant in voluntarily undergoing a drunk-
ometer test waived his privilege of not testifying against himself. State
v. Cash, 219 N.C. 818, 15 S.E.2d 277 (1941); State v. Haner, 231 Iowa
348, 1 N.W.2d 91 (1941). Example of proper instructions to jury: "Evi-
dence has been introduced as to an analysis of blood that was taken from
the defendant shortly after his arrest in this case. This analysis is not
admissible unless this blood was obtained from the defendant voluntarily,
and without coercion, and without any inducement or promise of immunity
from prosecution. If you find that the defendant voluntarily permitted
said blood to be analyzed, and that it was obtained without any induce-
ment or promise of immunity from prosecution, then you will give this
evidence respecting this analysis such weight as you think it is entitled
to in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant."
12. 29 VA. L. Rv. 749, 761 (1943).
13. 74 N.C. 646, 647 (1876).
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intoxication. No reported cases have been found in Missouri
concerning the use of chemical evidence as proof of intoxication.
In State v. TeltatoW4 the defendant was being tried for mur-
der. A doctor for the state testified that he had examined the
head wounds of the defendant and gave his opinion as to how
they had been made. The court held that there was evidence that
the examination by the doctor was voluntarily consented to by
the defendant and also that it was necessary to treat the wounds
so thus this consent constituted a waiver by the defendant of his
privilege not to be made to testify against himself in a criminal
case.
State v. JonesW 5 is a case where the defendant was being tried
for robbery in the first degree. There was evidence that he vol-
untarily allowed the sheriff and also a doctor called by the sheriff
to examine wounds in his leg; this was done for the purpose of
identifying the defendant. The court again held that the defen-
dant had waived his privilege as to self-incrimination.
Thus it can be seen from these two cases, that if there is
evidence that the defendant voluntarily submits to a physical
examination, Missouri holds that there is no violation of his
privilege not to be made to testify against himself. Using the
same reasoning as found in these cases it would seem that there
would be no objection to the use of chemical tests as proof of
intoxication provided that the defendant voluntarily agreed to
the making of the tests.
The next question that arises is whether or not the accused
can be compelled to take the tests. In a Texas case involving a
defendant charged with murder without malice arising out of an
automobile accident as a result of driving while under the in-
fluence of intoxicationg liquor, the court held that as there was
evidence that the defendant was compelled to take the tests he
was thus being made to testify as against himself.' 6
There are several Missouri cases which deal with the taking
of a physical examination without the consent of the defendant.
14. 159 Mo. 354, 60 S.W.2d 743 (1900).
15. 153 Mo. 457, 55 S.W. 80 (1900).
16. Apodaca v. State, 146 S.W.2d 381 (Texas 1941). Defendant said
that police made him give specimen of urine against his will, made him
outstretch his arms and touch the tip of his nose, made him walk fast,
walk slow, and turn quickly. "Compulsion is the keynote of the prohibition."
Case criticized: Notes, 19 TExAs L. Rsv. 463 (1941); 15 U. OF CIN. L.
REV. 344 (1941); 26 WASH. & LEE L. Ruv. 122 (1941).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/12
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This is an important question in Missouri since, as has already
been noted, Missouri does not limit the doctrine of self-incrimina-
tion to testimonial utterances only.
In State v. Horton the defendant was being tried for the crime
of rape. He was compelled to submit to a physical examination
to determine whether or not he was suffering from a venereal
disease. The court said:
When a man is under arrest, without counsel, and, speaking
metaphorically, is standing in the shadow of a policeman's
club, it requires something much more susbtantial than si-
lence to justify an invasion of his constitutional right not to
be made to furnish evidence against himself..17
And again, in State v. Matsinger,8 the court said that the only
consent on the part ol the defendant was his failure to object
when being informed that physicians were at the jail to examine
him. It was found that the defendant was not apprised of his
rights to resist the examination and thus submitted without con-
senting to the examination. The court stressed the fact that the
defendant was in jail at the time.
The case of State v. Newcombe9 also involves a physical ex-
amination for venereal disease. In this case the court said that
the defendant had no option in the matter so the testimony was
incompetent and inadmissible and violative of defendant's con-
stitutional rights not to be compelled to testify against himself.
From these three cases it becomes apparent that under Mis-
souri law, the compelling of a defendant to submit to a chemical
test to determine his degree of intoxication without his consent
would be held by the courts to be a violation of the constitutional
provision that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
The next question that arises is, What constitutes consent?
There are several cases that have been reported which give
examples as to what has been considered proper consent in
courts of states other than Missouri. It has been held that re-
sults of the tests are admissible where defendant thought he had
to give a blood specimen and so consented to the taking of the
specimen. 20 In another case where defendant submitted to the
17. State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 663, 153 S.W. 1051, 1053 (1912).
18. 180 S.W. 856 (Mo. 1915).
19. 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909).
20. State v. Werling, 239 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W.2d 377 (1943).
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taking of a specimen because the physician stated that it was his
opinion that the defendant was intoxicated and he would so
testify, but the test might prove that defendant was not intoxi-
cated, the court held that there was neither duress nor illegal
search and seizure and the results were admissible.21 Where the
defendant did not know why the specimen (urine) was taken the
court held that the results of the specimen given without com-
pulsion were admissible.2 2
It is extremely doubtful whether or not the courts of Missouri
would have arrived at the same decision. On the basis of the
decision in State v. Matsinger2" it would seem that the defendant
would have to be apprised of his right to refuse to submit to the
test and would have to do something more than merely acquiesce
to the demands of the police that he submit to a chemical test.
Assuming that the defendant has refused to permit the police
to take a specimen from him for the purpose of performing a
test as to his degree of intoxication, can this fact be commented
upon by the state at time of trial? There are several decisions
from other states on this point.24 It is to be noted in these de-
cisions allowing comment on the defendant's refusal to submit
to a test that the constitution of the state permits such comments
or that there are no express provisions in the constitution pro-
hibiting self-incrimination.
The Missouri cases on the subject of comment all refer to the
failure of the defendant to testify or to produce a document,
chattel, etc. The case of State v. Carey25 holds that it is not im-
proper for the state to comment on the failure of the defendant
21. State v. Small, 233 Iowa 1280, 11 N.W.2d 377 (1943).
22. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937) (self-incrimina-
tion is limited to testimonial utterances).
23. State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051 (1912). In the Hallo-
way v. State, 175 S.W.2d 258 (Texas 1943), the question arose as to
whether or not the defendant could consent to the taking of a urine speci-
men if he was intoxicated. The defendant contended that if he was intoxi-
cated when he agreed to give the urine specimen it was not a voluntary
act; if it was a voluntary act and he could consent to the taking of the
specimen, then he was not in fact intoxicated. The court held, that although
the defendant was found to have 0.24% alcohol in his urine the defendant
did not claim in his own testimony that he was so drunk that he did not
know that he consented to give such specimen or that it was not voluntarily
given. Thus the defendant was held to be intoxicated enough to sustain a
conviction, but not enough to effect his consent.
24. State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1945); State v.
Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 122, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Nutt, 65 N.E.2d
675 (Ohio 1946).
25. 311 Mo. 461, 228 S.W. 719 (1925).
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to make a statement or explanation when arrested. It would
seem that on this basis, as Missouri makes no distinction as be-
tween testimonial utterances and the taking of physical examina-
tions as pertaining to the doctrine of waiver, that it can be
argued that it might be proper for the state to comment on the
failure of the defendant to submit to the taking of a specimen
for a chemical test at the time of his arrest.
III
Although it is believed that the law of Missouri will permit
chemical testing to be introduced into evidence as proof of intoxi-
cation, it is recommended that a statute be passed making chemi-
cal testing the law of the land.2 6 Under the terms of the statute
it would be compulsory for the defendant to submit to the taking
of a chemical test in order to determine his degree of intoxica-
tion. The advantages of such a statute, as pointed out by Monroe,
are:
Where test results are interpreted by law, the need for em-
ployment of expert witnesses is reduced accordingly. The
one becomes substituted for the other ...
.... Interpretive legislation assists in shifting the problem
of proof away from the determination of how many drinks
and what kind of drinks the accused had, to the simple
evidentiary fact of how much alcohol per volume was present
in the blood and what that signifies in terms of intoxication
influence ....
[The test] .... substitutes certainty for guesswork, scien-
tific determination in place of superficial opinion evidence.
27
An example of such legislation is found in Section 54, Act V,
Uniform Vehicle Code which, while setting up the three general
zones that the percentage of alcohol is divided into, also provides
for the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing on
the subject.2 8
Mamet, in his excellent article, "Constitutionality of Compul-
sory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication," points
,out two grounds upon which the constitutionality of such a
26. States having such a statute include: Indiana, Maine, Nebraska
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and
Washington.
27. Monroe, The Drinking Driver: Problems of Enforcement, 8 Q. J.
OF STUDIES ON ALCOHOL, No. 3, p. 388, 400 (Dec. 1947).
28. Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws, National Conference on Sheet
and Highway Safety (12 Oct. 1944).
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statute might rest while still recognizing the issue of self-incrimi-
nation.29 He points out that the use of the highway is a privi-
lege; the legislature can exclude an automobile therefrom. The
legislature can prohibit the use of the highways to anyone who
is not willing to submit to a chemical test. The other method is
through the use of the police power of a state to regulate the
highways for the protection and safety of the public as a whole.
This is based on the assumption that the use of the highway is
a right and not a privilege, but this right is not entirely un-
restrictive and the interests of the individual balance as against
the interests of the public as a whole and it is thus within the
purview of the police power to effectuate a balance as between
these interests. The latter theory does not involve the doctrine
of waiver as is found in the former theory.
IV
At the time of this writing it has been announced that the
St. Louis Police are going to start giving the breath test as of
January 1, 1950. This is a step in the right direction. The test
is being used at present in Kansas City and Richmond Heights,
Missouri, but as yet there are no court decisions based on its use.
In view of the alarming increase in drinking drivers who are
involved in accidents the state as a whole should have a testing
program.
It is felt that the courts of the state will be sympathetic to-
wards the use of such evidence and it is believed that it can be
used, subject to such limitations as have been pointed out, under
existing law. When te results of such a program are brought to
the attention of the state legislature, then it should pass a
statute, as has been done in other states, providing for the use
of chemical tests as proof of intoxication.
WALTER J. TAYLOR, JR.
29. Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Deter-
mine Alcoholic Intoxication, 40 ILL. L. Rav. 245 (1945).
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